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Abstract— It has been assumed that the physical separation 
(‘air-gap’) of computers provides a reliable level of security, such 
that should two adjacent computers become compromised, the 
covert exchange of data between them would be impossible. 
 In this paper, we demonstrate BitWhisper, a method of bridg-
ing the air-gap between adjacent compromised computers by 
using their heat emissions and built-in thermal sensors to create 
a covert communication channel. Our method is unique in two 
respects:  it supports bidirectional communication, and it re-
quires no additional dedicated peripheral hardware. We provide 
experimental results based on implementation of BitWhisper 
prototype, and examine the channel’s properties and limitations. 
Our experiments included different layouts, with computers 
positioned at varying distances from one another, and several 
sensor types and CPU configurations (e.g., Virtual Machines). 
We also discuss signal modulation and communication protocols, 
showing how BitWhisper can be used for the exchange of data 
between two computers in a close proximity (at distance of 0-
40cm) at an effective rate of 1-8 bits per hour, a rate which 
makes it possible to infiltrate brief commands and exfiltrate 
small amount of data (e.g., passwords) over the covert channel. 
 Keywords—air-gap; bridging; covert channel; tempera-
ture; sensors; exfiltration; infiltration (key words) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An air-gapped network is a computer network in which 
security measures are taken to maintain physical and logical 
separation from other, less secured networks. The term air-
gap may sometimes refer to an interface between two systems 
or networks in which data transfers are handled manually 
(e.g., a human operator copies data from one system onto a 
flash-drive and then walks over to another system and con-
nects the flash-drive to it [1]). Air-gapped networks are often 
used in cases in which the information stored or generated by 
the network is highly sensitive or at risk of data leakage. For 
instance, military networks such as the Joint Worldwide Intel-
ligence Communications System (JWICS) are air-gapped 
networks [2] [3]. Despite the added security benefits of an air-
gapped network, such networks have been breached in recent 
years. The most famous cases are Stuxnet [4] and agents.btz 
[5], although other cases have also been reported [6].  
Despite these attacks, air-gapped networks are still used 
because they minimize the risk of data leakage and prevent 
malicious code and commands from being transmitted to the 
network.  
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A. Related Works 
Covert channels in general are widely discussed in profes-
sional literature, using diverse methods [7] [8] [9]. However, 
in this paper, we focus on covert channels that can bridge air-
gapped – or physically separated – computers. This subset of 
covert channels employs several physical phenomena, utiliz-
ing acoustic inaudible channels, optical channels, and elec-
tromagnetic emissions. Madhavapeddy et al [10] discuss so-
called ‘audio networking’, while Hanspach and Goetz [11] 
disclose a method for near-ultrasonic covert networking. 
Loughry and Umphress [12] discuss information leakage from 
optical emanations. Software-based hidden data transmission, 
using electromagnetic emission, is discussed by Kuhn and 
Anderson [13]. Guri et al [14] present ‘AirHopper’, a malware 
that utilizes FM emissions to exfiltrate data from an air-
gapped computer. Note that the aforementioned channels are 
unidirectional and do not permit the establishment of an in-
bound channel into an isolated network.  Technically speak-
ing, thermal radiation is a form of electromagnetic emanation, 
and this was, in fact, previously suggested by Murdoch [15] 
for use as a covert channel (discussed in ‘future work’ sec-
tion).  To the best of our knowledge, our current paper is the 
first to present academic research with successful and detailed 
results in this respect. 
B. Our contribution 
In this study, we present BitWhisper; a novel method for 
exchanging information between two adjacent personal com-
puters (PCs) that are part of separate, physically unconnected 
networks. BitWhisper establishes a covert channel by emitting 
heat from one PC to the other in a controlled manner. By reg-
ulating the heating patterns, binary data is modulated into 
thermal signals. In turn, the adjacent PC uses its built-in ther-
mal sensors to measure the environmental changes. These 
changes are then sampled, processed, and demodulated into 
binary data. 
Our experimental results demonstrate that BitWhisper is 
capable of a rate of eight signals per hour. Although this rate 
may seem slow compared with the previously mentioned 
methods of bridging air-gaps, BitWhisper offers two unique 
and useful characteristics: 1) the channel supports bidirection-
al (half-duplex) communication as both PCs can act as a 
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 transmitter (producing heat) or receiver (by monitoring the 
temperature), and 2) establishing the channel is possible using 
off-the-shelf adjacent desktop PCs and requires no special 
hardware or supporting components. These properties enable 
the attacker to exfiltrate information from inside an air-
gapped network, as well as transmit commands to it. Further-
more, the attacker can use BitWhisper to directly control a 
malware’s actions inside the network and receive feedback.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion  II discusses the attack scenario, and section  III provides 
technical background. Sections  IV and  V present the experi-
mental setup and experimental results respectively. Section  VI 
discusses the data modulation. Section  0 discusses counter-
measures, and we conclude with section  VII. 
II. ATTACK SCENARIO 
BitWhisper, as a generic covert channel, can be utilized 
for various purposes. However, we explore its use as a meth-
od for bridging the air-gap between physically separated net-
works. In this section we discuss a possible attack model in 
which BitWhisper is used by an attacker to achieve this goal. 
The environmental settings are comprised of a facility or of-
fice space in which PCs are either part of an isolated network 
or a public network, such as the Internet. The attack model 
consists of several phases. During the first phase, the attacker 
infects networks connected to the Internet, a part of the attack 
which can be accomplished using targeted malicious emails 
combined with social engineering and other similar methods. 
During the second, considerably more challenging phase, the 
attacker goes on to contaminate a node of the internal net-
work. This can be done by attacking the supply chain [16], 
planting an infected USB drive, using a malicious insider, or 
some equivalent tactic. Several recent incidents have shown 
that this type of breach is feasible [4] [5] [6] [17].  
At this point, having established a foothold in both net-
works, the attacker may bridge the air-gap between the net-
works in order to covertly exfiltrate a highly sensitive piece of 
information (e.g., passwords, or secret keys). Alternatively, 
the attacker may trigger a worm attack inside the isolated 
network or send a malicious command to an isolated industri-
al control system. After infecting the networks, the malware 
spreads over both networks and searches the surroundings for 
additional PCs within close proximity, spatially. Proximity is 
determined by periodically sending ‘thermal pings’ (demon-
strated in Figure 1) over the air. Once a bridging attempt is 
successful, a logical link between the public network and the 
internal network in established. At this stage, the attacker can 
communicate with the formerly isolated network, issuing 
commands and receiving responses. 
 
Figure 1.  A “thermal ping” sent between two adjacent PCs. The 
snapshots were taken by using a thermal camera. 
 
III. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 
In this section, we provide a technical survey of the ther-
mal emissions of PCs along with methods used to cool them. 
This review will assist the reader in understanding how heat 
from one PC is emitted and then detected by an adjacent PC 
in a controlled manner.  
A. Ambient Heat Sources in a PC 
Like many electrical systems, PCs generate heat. The law 
of conservation of energy states that energy is conserved over 
time; excess power dissipates as heat, primarily in a physical 
process called Joule heating.  Joule heating (also termed resis-
tive heating) occurs when the passage of an electric current 
through a conductor releases heat. The generated heat is pro-
portional to the current and voltage of the system [18]. Com-
plex electronic systems such as the central processing unit 
(CPU) of a modern PC requires varying amounts of power 
(current and voltage) proportional to the workload of the sys-
tem. This workload directly affects the amount of heat gener-
ated by the system. The dynamic power consumption of a 
CPU is generalized by the formula  
                (1) 
Where   is the power consumption in watts, C is the ca-
pacitance of the CPU in farads, f is the operating frequency in 
Hz, V is the voltage in volts and   is the percentage of the 
system that is active [19]. When the system is under load and 
executing different instructions,   clearly increases as does 
the capacitance C, because more switching gate capacitors 
need to be charged. Higher operating frequencies also require 
quicker charging and discharging of logical gates, achieved by 
increasing the CPU voltage and frequency. To summarize, an 
increased CPU workload on a modern system causes in-
creased power consumption across all parameters, therefore 
increasing the temperature as well.  
In addition to the CPU, modern computers also contain 
other components that emit a significant amount of heat, in-
cluding the graphics-processing unit (GPU) and other mother-
board components such as the voltage regulator modules 
(VRM) and I/O controllers- Other heat sources in a computer 
include mechanical systems such as a hard drive or optical 
drive. 
B. Thermal Sensors in PCs 
Electronic systems like computers and smartphones incor-
porate multiple thermal sensors to monitor their various com-
ponents and ambient temperature. Thermal sensors allow the 
system to protect itself from damage or performance degrada-
 tion by decreasing the system's workload, activating external 
cooling systems such as fans, or even performing emergency 
shutdowns. In this section, we briefly survey common thermal 
sensors found in modern computer systems. Later, in sec-
tion  VI, we use some of these sensors to receive thermal sig-
nals transmitted through the air.  
1) CPU/GPU Thermal Sensors 
CPUs and GPUs contain multiple built-in temperature 
sensing diodes. In the case of CPUs, these diodes enable the 
system to measure the internal temperature of each core of the 
CPU separately. In addition to the CPU core's internal sen-
sors, some processors include sensors that monitor the outside 
of the CPU package. In a typical PC, the difference between 
the internal temperature of a CPU and the ambient tempera-
ture inside the PC’s chassis may be tens of degrees. Interest-
ingly, CPU sensors are designed to be more accurate at higher 
operating temperatures, while being notoriously inaccurate at 
lower temperatures [20].  
2) Motherboard Thermal Sensors 
Motherboards usually incorporate thermal sensors and 
cooling fan controls in order to allow for buzzer alarms or 
emergency shutdowns at extreme temperatures, thus prevent-
ing damage to the computer's sensitive components. Sensing 
is usually performed by the I/O controller for easy monitoring 
by an application. It is common to place these sensors in loca-
tions that are relatively distant from heat sources, in order to 
monitor the motherboard's temperature itself. In many moth-
erboard models, the overheat threshold (the CPU temperature 
at which the computer shuts down to prevent damage) can be 
changed in the BIOS. 
3) Other Thermal Sensors 
Voltage regulators in a PC supply the required voltage to 
its CPUs and GPUs. Voltage converters are generating a sig-
nificant amount of heat and require thermal sensing and con-
trol. Some computer cases have fans and other cooling meth-
ods intended to cool a specific component while dissipating 
heat from the entire chassis. To that end, thermal sensors are 
placed in the way of the airflow created by these fans, or on 
the chassis itself. Most hard disk drives and solid-state drives 
have built-in temperature sensors. A diagnostic software can 
access these sensor readings through an interface called the 
Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology 
(S.M.A.R.T) interface [21]. 
Table 1 summarizes the thermal sensors and their primari-
ly characteristics. 
Table 1. Survey of thermal sensors (common values) 
sensor idle temper-
ature ( ) 
max temper-
ature ( ) 
sensor 
resolution 
CPU 33-35 130 1  degree 
GPU 33-35 105 1  degree 
Motherboard 33-35 90 1  degree 
Voltage 
regulator 
31-33 90 1  degree 
Hard-disk 
drives 
35 55 1  degree 
Solid-state 
drives 
25-30 70 1  degree 
 
C. Cooling Mechanisms for PCs 
Some components of a computer may become temporarily 
unusable or damaged permanently if not cooled properly. For 
stable continuous operation of the PC, these components must 
receive sufficient cooling to counter their heat emissions. 
There are two methods of cooling: passive and active.  
Passive methods cool the component by letting the heat 
dissipate naturally into the air on its own or with the help of a 
heat-sink (to conduct and disperse the heat via direct contact). 
For most chips found in a PC, this is the cooling method of 
choice. However, some chips may generate enough heat under 
regular usage to damage themselves. In these cases, passive 
cooling is not sufficient.  
Active methods attempt to speed up the convection pro-
cess by including a fan or possibly other mechanisms that 
involve liquid or gaseous coolants. The most common active 
cooling method found in PCs is to couple a fan with a heat-
sink, because it is inexpensive and effective. While rotating, a 
fan helps divert the heat absorbed by the heat-sink from the 
heat emitting component and dissipate the hot air out of the 
case. The effectiveness of the cooling process depends on the 
amount of heat generated by the component and the size and 
rotational speed of the fan.  
In a typical PC, a fan is placed on the CPU and in the 
power supply. Other common configurations include the 
placement of fans on the left/back side of the case. Since cold 
air is denser than hot air, the cold air moves downward while 
the hot air is pushed upward. Because of this fact, the fan 
configurations in a PC are typically designed to bring in cold 
air from the front of the case (at the bottom) while pushing the 
hot exhaust out from the back (at the top). Fans are either 
wired to the motherboard through dedicated connections or 
directly to the power supply with a 3-pin connector. For speed 
control, fans may be wired to the motherboard or to an exter-
nal controller with a 4-pin connector. Typical fan speed is 
approximately a few thousand revolutions per minute (RPM). 
Fans can be controlled in the OS by software, through OS 
device manager services, and the computer's BIOS, but the 
most dominant factor affecting fan speed is the current CPU 
temperature. Table 2 summarizes the fans found in common 
PCs.  
 
 
 
 
 Table 2. Common PC fans 
Location  Primary role Optional RPM 
Motherboard 
(CPU socket) 
cools the CPU No 800-4000 
Front bottom pulls cold air in from 
outside 
Yes 800-4000 
Rear top cools power supply 
and expels exhaust 
Yes 800-4000 
Side cools GPU and 
drives 
Yes 800-4000 
IV. PHYSICAL CHANNEL EXPERIMENT SETUP 
In this section, we discuss our experimental setup which is 
designed to evaluate heat emissions as a viable signaling 
channel between two PCs. Since the proposed channel is half-
duplex, we will evaluate one direction of a communication at 
a time. Therefore, for the duration of this paper, we refer to 
the PC that emits the heat as the ‘sender’ or ‘transmitter’ and 
the PC that monitors the environmental temperature as the 
‘receiver’. A channel configuration reflects the technical and 
spatial configurations that two communicating PCs may have, 
directly affecting the channel's performance.  
A. Experiment Methodology 
The experiments involved two types of setups: a single PC 
setup or a setup involving a pair of PCs. With the single PC, 
we evaluated the thermal properties (e.g., heating and cooling 
rates) of an active PC under different workloads. In the setup 
involving two PCs, we evaluated the mutual thermal effects 
between adjacent computers First, using the single PC setup, 
we performed a series of CPU workload trials. The objective 
was to understand the amount of heat that was effectively 
generated and how quickly this heat dissipates, as well as how 
these changes registered in the different sensors. For each 
trial, we generated different workloads and monitored the 
local heat from the same computer's sensors. Afterwards, 
using the two PC configurations, we examined the effect of 
the transmitter's heat on the receiver and its environmental 
sensors. Several series of trials were performed to analyze the 
many possible combinations that may affect the channel. For 
instance, some of the parameters analyzed were the transmit-
ter/receiver's relative distance, chassis type, and relative lay-
out. Lastly, we tested the feasibility of emitting heat from 
within a virtual machine guest OS. We found that although 
the physical CPU is controlled by the host OS, the guest OS 
can use it indirectly as a thermal transmitter. 
B. Experiment Setup 
1) Test environment  
Tests were conducted in two environments: 1) a regular 
office room (3 by 4 meters) with standard furniture, no win-
dows, and a closed door, and 2) a larger shared office space (4 
by 9 meters) with a small window and an open door. The 
computers were either placed above or below a table or inside 
a computer desk tray. An additional experiment was conduct-
ed in an open room environment (described later). Environ-
mental temperature during the tests was controlled using the 
office's air-conditioning system. 
2) Hardware 
We used two sets of PCs for the experiments. The first set 
consisted of PCs with a GIGABYTE GA-H87M-D3H moth-
erboard and a quad-core hyper-threaded Intel i7-4790 proces-
sor with a built-in Intel HD Graphics 4600 display adapter. 
Both computers had an identical, regular no-brand tower case, 
with one fan in the back of the case in addition to the CPU 
and PSU fans. The chassis had a perforated square area on the 
left side, in front of the CPU fan, and a perforated region near 
the back and PSU fans. The second set of PCs consisted of 
Lenovo m57-6072 computers with an Intel Q35 Express chip-
set, an Intel core 2-duo processor with an integrated display 
adapter. The Lenovo 6072 had a small-form-factor case with a 
perforated front and back panels with a single fan blowing air 
out of the back.  We also conducted tests with large tower 
case manufactured by Gigabyte from the GZ series with a 
H77-D3H motherboard, and a quad-core hyper-threaded Intel 
i7-3770 with a built-in Intel HD Graphics 4000 display adapt-
er. The large case dimensions are 9X48X41 cm. For most of 
the tests, fan speeds were controlled by the default settings of 
the motherboard. The impact of environment temperatures on 
fan speeds was tested using an AK-FC-08-AT Asetek fan 
controller kit. The virtual machine heat emission experiment 
was conducted using Oracle VirtualBox. The environmental 
temperature and heat expansion around the PCs were captured 
by a Fluke VT04A visual infra-red thermometer and a FLIR 
T335 thermal imaging camera. 
3) Software  
In order to generate heat, we performed CPU and GPU 
stress tests. Our code placed heavy stress on the processors by 
performing CPU intensive calculations and busy loops. We 
also used FurMark, a GPU stress tester [22] and prime95, a 
program for finding Mersenne primes that induces a high 
CPU load and is popular for CPU benchmarking and stress 
testing [23]. The computers in the experiments used a back-
ground program called HWInfo [24] which sampled and rec-
orded the various thermal sensors and PC fan speeds. The 
sample rate was 0.5Hz, and all monitored sensors were CPU 
and motherboard stock sensors. Using the 0.5Hz sample rate, 
HWInfo in itself utilizes very little CPU time and we validat-
ed that it had a negligible effect on the measurements. 
4) Layouts and Distances  
We conducted tests with different layouts of adjacent pairs 
of PCs. The layouts reflected common scenarios in which two 
PCs are placed next to one another in typical office environ-
ments. Close proximity between PCs may occur in a shared 
office shared by two employees with adjacent desks or in a 
private office in which a single employee has more than one 
personal computer near his desk. The latter is common in 
work environments with air-gapped networks since security 
measures usually require the employee to have a separate 
computer for each network.  
From our observations, in the typical scenario, two desktops 
are placed side by side (Figure 2) at distances ranging from 1 
 to 40 cm. Moreover, the PCs were generally positioned with 
the back panel facing a wall or in the middle of the room. This 
layout is used in our experiments unless otherwise mentioned, 
and is referred to as the parallel layout.  Other layouts tested 
include: 1) both PCs placed horizontally, one on top of the 
other, with the transmitting computer placed either on the top 
or the bottom (i.e., stacked layout); 2) two computers placed 
back-to-back, with the back panels facing each other; this  
layout reflects the common scenario of two employees shar-
ing an office with desks facing each other (i.e., face-away 
layout), and 3) two computers positioned in some form of 
angle (i.e., quadrature layout). An illustration of the different 
layouts is given in Appendix A. 
 
  
Figure 2. Two air-gapped PCs positioned in the parallel layout. 
The left computer transmits a command that instructs the right 
computer to calibrate & fire a USB game rocket. 
 
V. PHYSICAL CHANNEL EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In this section, we discuss the physical characteristics of 
the channel obtained from the experiments described in sec-
tion  IV. Based on the experimental results, we developed a 
basic communication channel (section  VI). 
A. Internal Heat Emissions of a PC 
The thermal properties of a PC (i.e., heating-rate versus 
CPU utilization) are important since they directly affect the 
signal quality. During our research, we identified three types 
of sensors that are significantly affected by the environment’s 
temperature: A) the CPU’s internal temperature sensor, B) 
other temperature sensors such as those in the CPU and HD, 
and C) the fan speed in RPM. As described in previous sec-
tions, a PC's workload has a direct effect on the temperature 
of its components. This subsection examines how and when 
heat is emitted from within a PC in order to understand how 
that may affect a thermal communication channel. 
1) Warming and Cooling  
Figure 3 shows a PC's temperature captured by its various 
thermal sensors over 40 minutes of 100% CPU utilization 
followed by 40 minutes of nearly 0% utilization. It is apparent 
that CPU loads have a direct impact on the CPU core's ther-
mal sensors (sensor group A) due to an almost instantaneous 
increase of about 20  in the temperature. The motherboard's 
temperature sensors (sensor group C) showed a +10  change 
over 30 minutes. The voltage regulator temperature remained 
static for the entire duration of the test and was removed from 
the figures in all further analysis. From a spatiotemporal per-
spective, the sensors closer to the heat source were more in-
tensely impacted. Note that it takes about 1.5-3 minutes of 
continuous work for the ambient temperature sensor to in-
crease by 1 . This rate decreases slightly as temperatures rise 
but remains constant for a maximum of 10  above the idle 
temperature.  
 
Figure 3. Temperature readings from various thermal sensors in 
a desktop PC as influenced by 100% CPU utilization over 40 
minutes. 
Once the full CPU utilization stops (minute 40), its inter-
nal temperature immediately drops. The ambient case temper-
ature sensor shows that it took about 1-3 minutes for a drop 
of   , with the rate decreasing slightly as it gets closer to the 
idle temperature.  
In general, we observed that the PC heats up faster near its 
idle temperature and cools faster near its maximum tempera-
ture. This is because at higher temperatures, the fans rotate 
faster in order to conduct the heat at a faster rate. 
2) Casual Thermal Emissions 
It is important to measure the heat that a PC generates dur-
ing casual work in order to anticipate its effect on the thermal 
communication channel. Obviously, a frequently changing PC 
workload can generate internal heat that interferes with the 
original heat transfer. Therefore it is clear that the optimal 
time to emit thermal signals would be when the PC is idle 
(e.g., during the night). However, in order to demonstrate the 
negligible affects casual usage has on the channel, we evalu-
ated the system’s thermal emissions during typical daily tasks.   
Figure 4 shows a PC’s internal ambient temperature 
alongside its CPU utilization and CPU internal temperature 
during 30 minutes of daily work. As a reference, we used a 
typical workstation with an Intel i7-4790 processor, running 
windows 7 64Bit. The user's activities include writing a doc-
ument using Microsoft Word, browsing several websites con-
currently using Google Chrome with multiple tabs, and 
 watching video stream on YouTube.  As can be observed 
from the test, none of the workloads accompanies by a rise in 
ambient temperature. The thermal level remained essentially 
the same while the ambient temperature was constant at 32 . 
Therefore, it is feasible to use a workstation as a receiver 
during regular work hours, as long as the local CPU does not 
have an unusual workload. As can be noticed, the CPU heat-
ing sensor is much prone to interference by a user's regular 
work patterns. 
 
Figure 4. A PC’s internal ambient temperature compared to its 
CPU internal temperature and utilization during routine use. 
 
B. Two Party Thermal Channel 
Thus far, we have shown that a PC’s heat level can be 
controlled by regulating different workloads on CPU. It is 
known that a PC’s internal fans vent the heat exhaust. This 
heat is emitted to the immediate local vicinity and beyond. In 
the following subsections we show how the emitted heat af-
fects nearby computer cases, thereby signaling other PCs via 
their thermal sensors 
1) Sensor Selection 
A Single Input Multiple Output (SIMO) channel correlates a 
signal received from multiple vantage points, thereby boost-
ing the signal with respect to natural noise and other interfer-
ences. It is possible to form a SIMO channel by correlating all 
of the thermal sensors together. However, for simplicity, we 
will only view the channel as a single input single output 
(SISO) channel. Improving the results (e.g., bandwidth) by 
using a SIMO channel will be addressed in future dedicated 
research. 
A receiver PC on the channel output must monitor its 
thermal sensors continuously in order to identify changes in 
the ambient temperature. To maximize the signal quality, we 
performed experiments in order to identify the sensors which 
best capture the environmental temperature changes. Based on 
our experiments, we identified two important aspects of ther-
mal sensors related to receiving signals on the channel’s out-
put: 1) the sensor’s technical specifications, and 2) its location 
within the receiver.  
Sensor specifications include: 1) sampling rate, 2) accura-
cy, 3) sample quantization resolution, and 4) value range 
(minimum and maximum temperature). Most sensors offer a 
sampling rate higher than required for accurate measurements. 
A more accurate sensor with higher quantization resolution 
can better distinguish between subtle changes in temperature 
level, thereby increasing the channel bit-rate. The range of the 
sensor must include the minimum and maximum temperatures 
used by the channel.  
The experimental results indicate that the ambient sensor 
from sensor group B is the best sensor to use in the SISO 
channel. This is due to its accurate response to environmental 
temperature changes and the fact that it is relatively unaffect-
ed by the sharp CPU spikes caused by casual background 
processes. Some of the tests results appear in Figure 5. 
We note that in cases in which a PC is unequipped with 
these thermal sensors (e.g., they are taken out or inaccessible), 
even the thermal sensor of HD may be used to sense the 
channel’s output. 
 
Figure 5. Temperature readings from various thermal sensors in 
a desktop PC as externally influenced by a transmitting comput-
er over 40 minutes. 
2) Distances 
An important part of the channel setup is the distance be-
tween the transmitter and receiver. The effect of the heat emit-
ted from a PC’s exhaust ports has a limited radius, thereby 
limiting the maximum channel distance. Beyond that radius, 
the heat intensity fades and expands across the room. Moreo-
ver, in common with all physical communication channels, 
there is a propagation delay between a channel’s inputs 
(transmission) and outputs (its reception some distance away). 
The propagation delay is directly correlated to the distance 
between the two parties. During the experiments we observed 
that the receiver was not able to sense the change in tempera-
ture at a distance of more than 40 cm from the transmitter.  
In order to measure and evaluate channel properties, we 
had the transmitter send a steady signal using consistent heat 
generation, to a receiver computer.  The receiver logged the 
observed temperatures, each time at an increased distance. In 
this experiment, we used the common parallel layout and 
conducted a series of trials at distances of 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 
30, and 35 cm, and the results of the trials are documented in 
Figure 6. We observed that at short distances, the transmitter 
could affect the receiver by 1-4 . For example, when placed 
next to each other (~0 cm), the heat propagation delay for the 
 first    increase was three minutes. After 26 minutes the 
receiver recorded a +4  relative change. 
At longer distances (e.g., 30-35 cm), we observed that the 
transmitter could increase the receiver’s temperature by at 
most 1 . We mention this observation as a constraint for the 
digital modulation method in section VI. 
The experiment clearly demonstrates the relationship be-
tween the channel distance and the channel capacity (here 
represented as the output signal’s heat propagation delay). 
When within a certain radius from the transmitter, there is a 
near linear relationship: every 1 cm of distance from the re-
ceiver increases the heat propagation delay by approximately 
0.35 minutes.  
 
Figure 6.  Relationship between distance and rate of temperature 
increase in the parallel layout. 
3) Channel Asymmetry 
When the channel is used as a half-duplex channel, we no-
ticed that the transmission times for each direction were dif-
ferent. Intuitively, this type of asymmetric relation could be 
caused simply because of the variety of PC cases or different 
hardware components. However, more interestingly, when 
using the same type of case and hardware, the channel was 
still asymmetric. We found, however, that this was based on 
case orientation: for each common case orientation, the rela-
tive spatial locations of the motherboard’s heating sources had 
created different obstacles between them with respect to the 
other party’s sensors. Moreover, we observed that the bottom 
device benefits from a stacked configuration, since heat rises. 
Figure 7 illustrates the asymmetry of the half-duplex 
channel’s capacity between a pair of adjacent PCs in the par-
allel layout. As can be seen, the heat propagation delay in left-
to-right transmissions is smaller than a right-to-left.  
 
Figure 7. Channel asymmetrical properties. 
 
4) The Effects of Different Orientations 
The attacker is usually unaware of the physical layout of 
the communicating PCs with respect to one another within the 
context of the attack scenario (section II), and obviously can-
not control the layout. We explore the channel’s effectiveness 
across different possible layouts in order to determine the best 
and worst case scenarios in term of distances. 
Table 3 provides a summary of the results when a trans-
mitter sends a steady signal to the receiver for computers 
positioned in the stacked layout comparing those with top 
computer heating to those with bottom computer heading. Our 
experiment showed that the computers variously have a heat-
ing propagation delay of five minutes (transmitter at top) or 
12 minutes (transmitter at bottom). As previously explained, 
the difference is due to the location of the motherboard in 
relation to the receiver’s case: top computer motherboard are 
at the lower part of the case, closer to the bottom computer. 
Table 3. Properties of the stacked layout. 
 With top 
computer 
heating 
With bottom 
computer heating 
Heating computer tem-
perature range (°C) 
+9 degrees +10 degrees 
Adjacent computer tem-
perature range (°C) 
+3 degrees +1 degree 
Heat propagation delay - 
first degree increase 
5 minutes 12 minutes 
Heating time - to max 
temperature (heat-
er/adjacent) 
11/20 minutes 18/12 minutes 
Pause propagation delay 
- first degree decrease 
8 minutes 10 minutes 
Cooling time - from max 
to idle temperature.  
20+ minutes 10 minutes 
 
When the PCs were positioned in the face-away layout 
(where the backs of the PCs are facing each other), the heat 
propagation delay was almost 10 minutes, after which, no 
 further increase was recorded over 40 minutes of heating. 
However, the cooling time with this layout is less than 3 
minutes, which is relatively fast. Notably, no more than a     
increase was observed during 40 minutes of heating. This 
suggests that the unobstructed intake of cool air from the sides 
of both cases has a significant cooling effect. Figure 8 details 
the sensor reading of a test preformed using this layout. 
 
Figure 8. Heat transfer during 40 minutes of heating, face-away 
layout. 
 
Although uncommon, we investigated the scenario where 
the PCs are in the quadrature layout (where the posterior side 
of transmitter points to the side of the receiver). From a dis-
tance of 6 cm between the transmitter and the receiver, the 
heat propagation delay is 115 seconds, which is relatively fast.  
An increase of 4  took 11 minutes, and the cooling time was 
approximately 100 seconds. 
5) Effects of location Relative to Walls or Furniture 
From our observations, the distance of the computers from 
other objects such as walls and furniture has a significant 
impact on thermal channels. To better understand their ef-
fects, we placed a pair of PCs in the parallel layout on top of a 
table in the middle of a room. In this scenario, the heat propa-
gation rate for 1  was about 25 minutes, shown in Figure 9. 
This was significantly longer compared with an arrangement 
in which the computers were 35cm apart and placed near a 
wall or table. The reason for this difference is that in the mid-
dle of the room, the hot air exhaust from the heating computer 
is completely unobstructed and does not affect the nearby 
receivers. Nevertheless, locating computers in the middle of 
the room without surrounding furniture or walls is far less 
common than being under a table or close to walls.  . 
 
Figure 9. Heat propagation over 40 minutes, parallel layout in 
the middle of the room. 
C. Virtual Machines (VM) 
The virtualization technology has become very popular 
and accessible in modern IT environments. Workstations in 
which desktop operating systems host virtual machine guests 
are commonly used. In this case the host and guests are shar-
ing the physical processor. Thus, overloading the processor 
from inside the guest may have a limited heat generating ef-
fect compared to overloading the physical machine. Figure 10 
shows that controlling heat emission is also possible from 
within virtual machine guests. Tests were conducted using 
two adjacent computers positioned in the parallel layout. The 
transmitter side runs as a guest in VirtualBox, with four out of 
eight logical processors allocated to the virtual machine. 
Aside from the VM, all other parameters were identical to 
other tests using physical hosts. The tests indicate that operat-
ing from within the VM cause a heat propagation delay of 
about 3 minutes, only slightly higher than non-VM transmis-
sions. In addition, a maximum temperature increase of 3  
was observed which is less than the 4  increase observed in 
the experiment using physical hosts. This difference can be 
attributed to the limitation on the workload imposed by the 
hypervisor on the processors, primarily due to CPU sharing.  
 
Figure 10. Propagation delay of virtual machine guest versus 
physical machine host over 40 minutes. 
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VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This work introduces a new type of covert channel 
(codenamed BitWhisper), enabling communication between 
two air-gapped computers. Our covert channel exploits the 
thermal radiation emitted by one computer, operating within 
permissible heat boundaries, to deliver information to a 
neighboring computer, equipped with standard heat sensors. 
Our method does not require dedicated or modified hardware, 
and is based solely on software. We describe a complex yet 
feasible attack model, based on gradual contamination of 
computers from isolated networks and public networks, locat-
ed within one spatial zone, advancing through ‘thermal pings’ 
until eventually two spatially adjacent computers belonging to 
separate networks are found. BitWhisper allows those two air-
gapped computers to communicate with one another. We also, 
implement a working prototype of ‘BitWhisper’ to evaluate 
the capabilities and boundaries of the physical layer. A variety 
of settings, configurations and parameters, with varying dis-
tances and several types of target computers were evaluat-
ed. We also discuss modulation methods along with the initial 
handshaking protocol, aimed to deliver narrow-band commu-
nication between the two computers, at close distances. Bit-
Whisper provides a feasible covert channel, suitable for deliv-
ering command and control (C&C) messages, and leaking 
short chunks of sensitive data such as passwords. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Layouts illustration: (A) parallel layout; (B) quadrature layout; 
(C) stacked layout; (D) face-away (back-to-back) layout. 
